Why The US Is Worried About Canada & Europe’s Aircraft Manufacturing Talks

At the core of the debate is Canada’s quest for sovereignty over its fighter jets and concern over excessive US control over its defense, while the US is concerned about Canada’s ability to police its airspace and meaningfully fulfill its NORAD obligations. From this perspective, debates over costs and various capabilities, like taking off from unprepared runways, are largely distractions from the real issues. The real issues are profoundly geopolitical, touching upon the delicate balance of national security, economic interests, and military interoperability between two historically close allies.

Canada’s Long Road to F-35A Acquisition

Canada has faced a protracted and often politically charged journey in replacing its aging fleet of legacy CF-18 Hornets, which are the Canadian variant of the F/A-18 Hornet. These venerable jets, introduced in the early 1980s, have long exceeded their intended service life and are in dire need of replacement, arguably having been kept operational far beyond their prime. To illustrate the urgency, the US Marines have already retired their F/A-18 Hornets, and Australia, another key ally, replaced its Hornets with a mix of newer Super Hornets (an essentially new aircraft) and advanced F-35As.

The prolonged replacement process saw several political shifts and debates, including the Liberal government’s initial reluctance to embrace the F-35 due to perceived high costs and a desire for an open competition. This led to an interim solution where Canada purchased some of the retired Australian Hornets to serve as spares and augment its dwindling operational fleet, a testament to the severe need for modernization.

Ultimately, after years of deliberation and a comprehensive evaluation process, Canada officially selected the F-35A Lightning II to replace its Hornets. The program of record calls for 88 F-35A aircraft, a substantial investment aimed at modernizing the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) and ensuring its capabilities for decades to come. Currently, Canada is contracted to purchase the first 16 examples, with the initial four expected to be delivered in 2026. These early deliveries will be retained in Canada for crucial training, as the RCAF embarks on the complex transition to this next-generation stealth fighter. The present discourse is less about Canada outright canceling the F-35, given the existing contractual obligations, and more about the potential reduction of the overall order from 88 jets. Such a reduction could force Canada to operate two distinct types of fighter jets, a strategy adopted by several capable mid-sized air forces like the Royal Air Force, the Royal Australian Air Force, and the Italian Air Force, but one that introduces complexities in logistics, maintenance, and training.

The Indispensable Role of NORAD and Interoperability

At the very heart of the American perspective on Canada’s fighter jet choices lies the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). Established in 1958 during the Cold War, NORAD is a unique bi-national organization of Canada and the United States, responsible for aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning for North America. Its mandate extends from monitoring and defending against traditional aerial threats to detecting and tracking ballistic missiles and, increasingly, safeguarding against emerging threats in the Arctic.

Fighter jets within NORAD are much more than standalone combat aircraft; they are critical nodes within a vast, comprehensive, and highly integrated defense system. Unlike broader NATO alliances where Link 16 compatibility is sufficient for basic interoperability, NORAD demands a far deeper level of integration. A NORAD-certified aircraft must seamlessly utilize US-controlled IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) Mode 5, secure missile defense data links, and highly classified datalinks tied directly into sophisticated US early warning and command-and-control (C2) infrastructure. This level of secure, real-time data sharing is paramount for effective threat detection, identification, and response across the immense North American airspace, particularly in the strategically vital Arctic region.

The Gripen, while NATO-compatible with Link 16, NATO weapons, and Western sensors, has not been certified for integration into NORAD’s most sensitive and proprietary systems. Canada itself rejected the Gripen during its 2021 evaluation, partly because it assessed the Gripen as sufficient for basic tasks but ultimately insufficient for the full spectrum of NORAD demands. While Saab has publicly stated its ability to make the Gripen NORAD-compliant, it has yet to demonstrate how it can achieve this, largely because such a decision and the necessary technical clearances rest squarely with the United States, which maintains tight control over access to these critical defense systems. Canada’s existing CF-18s, in contrast, are fully integrated into NORAD operations, routinely participating in air sovereignty patrols and intercepts alongside US Air Force assets.

The US argues that the Gripen falls short of the stringent interchangeability required for optimal NORAD performance. The F-35, in contrast, was designed from its inception with proprietary US-controlled software and an entire ecosystem built to integrate flawlessly with NORAD’s advanced C2 infrastructure. Former US Ambassador to Canada, Pete Hoekstra, was notably blunt, describing the Gripen as an "inferior product" and one that is "not as interchangeable," underscoring the depth of US concern regarding interoperability.

A Conflict of National Security and Sovereignty

At its absolute core, the issue transcends aircraft specifications; it is one of national security and the delicate balance of allied sovereignty. For the US, the primary concern is not merely the potential loss of revenue from selling fewer F-35s. Instead, it is the fundamental strategic reality that Canadian airspace is inextricably linked to, and indeed serves as a critical northern "backdoor" to, US airspace and national security. From the American perspective, Canada must possess the capabilities to police its vast airspace to a standard that satisfies both its own defense needs and its NORAD commitments, ensuring the collective security of the continent.

However, the Canadian perspective, while acknowledging the importance of NORAD, is often very different. A perceived geopolitical deterioration of relations, or shifts in US foreign policy, can erode Canada’s trust in the US and ignite fears of a potential loss of sovereignty. From Canada’s point of view, the F-35 may indeed be the most capable fighter jet by a significant margin, but that capability can be perceived as undermined by the fear of a "kill-switch" – a hypothetical scenario where the US could disable or severely limit the aircraft’s functionality – and the broader concern of having the country’s top defensive capabilities entirely dependent on US technology, software, and sustainment. The US undeniably exercises substantial leverage through its control over advanced military hardware sales, a fact that fuels calls for greater Canadian defense autonomy.

This dynamic is not unique to Canada. The procurement of fighter jets has historically been akin to geopolitical marriage contracts, cementing strategic alignment between nations for decades. In South American countries like Colombia and Peru, debates over purchasing the Gripen or the F-16 are frequently overshadowed by the current governments’ desired diplomatic and military alignment with the United States. For instance, the US-skeptic government in Colombia initially favored the Gripen, while the pro-US opposition has reportedly lobbied the US to block the sale until a new election. Similarly, Peru’s Expreso newspaper reported that the Peruvian military was planning to cancel a Gripen deal in favor of the F-16 after the purchase became entangled in domestic politics, highlighting how deeply intertwined military procurement is with a nation’s foreign policy and strategic partnerships.

The Gripen: A Lightweight Fighter, Ill-Suited for Canada’s Unique Needs

Much is often made of the Gripen’s ability to take off from unprepared runways – a feature rooted in Sweden’s Cold War doctrine of dispersed operations. While it’s true the Gripen possesses certain design elements for this, such as higher air intakes, the narrative that this is unique or crucial for Canada is largely overstated. Many modern Western fighter jets, including the F-35A, can operate from austere or semi-prepared surfaces. Finland, for example, a nation with similar geographic and strategic considerations to Sweden regarding dispersed operations, uses its F/A-18s in this capacity and, significantly, selected the F-35A in 2021 as the best aircraft to continue that dispersed air force doctrine, explicitly over the Gripen.

Furthermore, while the Gripen is marketed as "designed for Arctic conditions," so too is the F-35A, which already operates extensively in cold-weather environments like Alaska and Norway, and will soon be deployed by Finland. The Eurofighter and F-16 also participate in exercises involving operations from unprepared bases. Crucially, for Canada, the primary requirement is not dispersed operations from short, unprepared strips, but rather the ability to patrol and defend the vastness of the Canadian North, where range and sophisticated sensors are paramount. In this context, the F-35A, with its significantly greater internal fuel capacity and advanced sensor suite, offers a distinct advantage. It’s also worth noting that when operating from short, unprepared landing strips, the Gripen E cannot even be fully fueled, let alone carry external fuel tanks, severely limiting its range and payload.

Beyond these operational considerations, the technical superiority of the F-35A over the Gripen is widely acknowledged. A leaked Canadian Department of National Defense report, reported by Radio Canada, revealed a stark difference in capabilities assessment: "the F-35 got a score of 95% on military capabilities, with a total of 57.1 points out of 60. By contrast, the Gripen-E finished with a score of 33%, netting 19.8 points out of 60." David Perry, president of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, succinctly summarized the findings: "The capability assessment here says that there is a clear-cut winner, no contest, no ambiguity. I’d expected that [the F-35] was going to be a clear winner, but this is a winner by a mile."

Cost and Competition: Apples and Oranges

The argument that the Gripen is "cheaper" than the F-35 is often misleading, frequently relying on apples-to-oranges comparisons of headline figures. While the F-35 program has faced cost overruns and delays, so too has the Gripen. Saab, for instance, is reportedly up to eight years behind in delivering the Gripen E to Brazil, with cost overruns equivalent to the price of "eight fighter jets," according to Defense Express. A true cost comparison must consider not just flyaway costs, but also lifetime sustainment, training, infrastructure upgrades, and the overall economic impact over several decades.

The Gripen E is fundamentally not an F-35A competitor. The F-35A, a fifth-generation stealth fighter with unparalleled sensor fusion and network-centric capabilities, occupies a unique category in the export market. The Gripen E, a highly capable 4.5th-generation fighter, instead primarily competes with other advanced 4th/4.5th-generation platforms like the Eurofighter Typhoon, Dassault Rafale, and, most frequently, the US’s own lightweight/medium fighter, the F-16 Block 70/72. In export markets where the Gripen E has secured orders (e.g., Brazil, Colombia, potential sales to Ukraine and Thailand), the alternative or most likely competitor was almost invariably the F-16 Block 70/72. In most of these cases, the F-35 was either not offered or was considered financially out of reach. Thailand, for example, reportedly sought the F-35 but was denied by the US, highlighting the distinct market segments these aircraft serve. The Gripen E is an excellent fighter in its class, but that class is demonstrably different from the F-35A.

The NORAD Hurdle for European Alternatives

It would be inaccurate to state that the US is worried about Canada purchasing the Saab Gripen outright. Instead, the concern centers on Canada significantly reducing its planned F-35A purchase, thereby potentially compromising its NORAD contributions. For the US, Canada acquiring the Gripen would be acceptable if it also maintains a sufficient fleet of F-35s to confidently execute its NORAD missions. Indeed, theoretically, the Dassault Rafale or Eurofighter Typhoon, both highly capable European 4.5th-generation fighters, might offer a better solution for Canada’s broader defense needs if they could become NORAD-compliant.

These European jets also hold the distinction of being largely free of US export controls, a factor that could address Canada’s sovereignty concerns more directly than the Gripen. Paradoxically, the Gripen E, powered by a GE Aerospace engine, remains significantly subject to US export controls, eating into Canada’s desire for full autonomy.

So, why did Canada not pursue the Rafale or Eurofighter more vigorously? The answer, it appears, lies squarely with the demanding NORAD-compliant requirement. In 2018, the Defense and Security Monitor reported that "Dassault Aviation has pulled its Rafale fighter jet out of Canada’s CF-18 replacement competition," citing concerns that "stem primarily from the fact that Canadian aircraft require a deep level of integration with U.S. systems due to joint NORAD missions." The Eurofighter followed suit in 2019, with Airbus stating, according to Skies Magazine, that "NORAD security requirements continue to place too significant of a cost on platforms whose manufacture and repair chains sit outside the United States-Canada 2-EYES community." This history reinforces the unique and challenging nature of NORAD integration, underscoring why the F-35, designed within that very ecosystem, emerged as the most practical and capable choice for Canada’s continental defense obligations.

In conclusion, the debate surrounding Canada’s fighter jet procurement is a complex tapestry woven with threads of national sovereignty, alliance commitments, technological superiority, and economic realities. While Canada seeks to assert greater independence in its defense acquisitions, the immutable geopolitical reality of NORAD and its profound implications for North American security dictate a strong preference for deeply integrated, fifth-generation capabilities that only the F-35A currently provides. The US concern is not about the specific brand of fighter jet, but rather about ensuring Canada’s continued, robust capacity to be a fully interoperable and effective partner in the shared defense of the continent.