Commentary: BRICS found consensus in New Delhi but that also showed its limits

The recent BRICS summit in New Delhi, marking the 20th anniversary of the grouping, concluded on September 13, 2026, against a turbulent global backdrop. Headlining the outcomes were a brief, yet symbolically potent, 20-second handshake between Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping, and a lengthy 140-paragraph joint declaration. These events starkly illustrated both the enduring value and the inherent challenges of maintaining cohesion within an increasingly diverse and expansive bloc. As Nazia Hussain, an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre for Multilateralism Studies at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, aptly points out, the carefully chosen, "watered-down" language in the joint declaration signaled not a true resolution of deep-seated differences, but rather the shrinking common ground upon which any meaningful consensus could be forged.

This particular summit was historic, being the first held with its expanded membership of 11 nations – Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – alongside 10 partner countries. The expansion, largely driven by China and supported by Russia, aimed to bolster the bloc’s representation of the Global South and enhance its leverage against established Western-led institutions. However, this very expansion also amplified the internal fault lines. The gathering convened amidst a volatile war in the Middle East, a conflict that directly implicates several member states, often on opposing sides. Iran and the UAE, for instance, have historically been regional rivals, and the ongoing conflict has seen Iran-aligned Houthi forces conducting attacks against Saudi Arabia. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE joined BRICS in 2023, bringing their complex regional animosities directly into the bloc’s deliberations.

Beyond the Middle East, a profound and persistent divide exists between two of BRICS’ founding members: India and China. Their relationship remains fraught with an unresolved Himalayan border dispute, which tragically led to a fatal clash in 2020 and continues to fuel military standoffs. This bilateral tension extends to a broader geopolitical rivalry for influence within the Global South, with both nations vying to be recognized as its leading voice. China, with its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), seeks to establish itself as the primary development partner, often drawing criticism for "debt trap diplomacy," while India champions alternative development models and a multipolar world order. These deep-seated divisions had already derailed attempts at consensus earlier in May 2026, when foreign ministers failed to reconcile their positions on the Iran war, leading to an absence of an agreed text. The negotiations leading up to the New Delhi summit were arduous, stretching over four days and continuing into the early hours of September 12, with the paragraph addressing West Asia proving to be the most contentious.

Ultimately, consensus was achieved, but at the cost of specificity. BRICS leaders called for "maximum restraint" in the Middle East, a deliberately ambiguous phrase that avoided assigning blame or specifying actors. This allowed all 11 member states to endorse the declaration without compromising their individual national positions. While securing a joint statement on an issue that so sharply divides its members might appear as a diplomatic triumph, its diluted language underscores a fundamental challenge: the increasing difficulty of finding substantive agreement within such a heterogeneous group. This narrowing common ground raises concerns about the bloc’s capacity to deliver anything beyond broad, non-committal statements.

The Convening Power of BRICS

Despite the challenges in reaching substantive consensus on contentious issues, the New Delhi summit showcased BRICS’ significant convening power, particularly through crucial developments that unfolded outside the formal plenary sessions. The highly anticipated meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi served as a powerful testament to this. President Xi had notably skipped the previous BRICS summit in Rio de Janeiro and had not visited India in seven years, making this interaction particularly significant. Their 20-second handshake, widely replayed and analyzed, underscored the diplomatic importance attached to merely opening channels of communication after years of frosty relations following the 2020 border clashes. Both leaders agreed that their countries "should be partners rather than rivals," a statement that, while aspirational, hinted at a shared understanding of the need for de-escalation and pragmatic engagement, especially in the context of global geopolitical shifts. This interaction was particularly noteworthy given the lack of a formal bilateral meeting between the two leaders at the preceding G20 summit, elevating the significance of their BRICS-facilitated exchange.

Similarly, the summit provided a vital platform for dialogue between Iran and the UAE. The Iranian president met with the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi on the sidelines, marking their highest-level direct contact since the Middle East conflict intensified. Both delegations subsequently alluded to steps towards de-escalation, demonstrating BRICS’ unique ability to bring together adversaries in a neutral space. This kind of high-level engagement between states with deep-seated conflicts and vastly different interests is a direct consequence of the bloc’s recent expansion. The inclusion of Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, despite their long-standing rivalry and proxy conflicts, forced them into a shared diplomatic environment. While their Beijing-brokered agreement to resume diplomatic ties in early 2023 was a significant breakthrough, the BRICS summit offered an additional, multi-lateral context for these delicate interactions, perhaps facilitating discussions that might have been harder to arrange bilaterally. This ability to bring disparate actors to the same table, even if they speak with different voices, is a fundamental strength of the expanded BRICS.

The Limits of Consensus: Financial Commitments and Geopolitical Stances

While BRICS demonstrated its capacity to foster dialogue among rivals, reaching concrete agreement proved easier on issues where no single member held a direct, contentious stake. This was particularly evident in the bloc’s financial commitments, which represented the most tangible outcomes of the joint declaration. Leaders encouraged the New Development Bank (NDB), originally known as the BRICS Development Bank, to significantly expand its local currency financing. This initiative allows developing countries to borrow in their own currencies, mitigating the risk of debt inflation due to volatile exchange rate fluctuations – a persistent problem that has plunged many poorer economies into recurrent financial crises. This pragmatic solution addresses a critical gap that traditional institutions like the World Bank have been slow to fully tackle.

The declaration also acknowledged progress on the BRICS Multilateral Guarantees initiative, initially launched in Rio. This mechanism aims to de-risk development projects, thereby attracting private capital into ventures that typically struggle to secure funding. While the scale of BRICS’ financial endeavors remains modest compared to some established players – the NDB has approved 139 projects worth approximately US$43 billion over a decade, versus the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank’s (AIIB) US$69 billion across 350 projects in the same period – it highlights where BRICS has found its most effective niche. It serves as an increasingly important alternative source of finance, offering developing countries more diverse options beyond the established, often conditional, lending frameworks of Western-dominated institutions. The long-term vision of promoting local currency financing also aligns with a broader ambition among BRICS nations to reduce reliance on the US dollar, fostering a more multipolar global financial system.

However, when it came to geopolitical flashpoints and trade disputes, alignment demanded intricate balancing and meticulously crafted, often vague, phrasing. The declaration’s stance on the Middle East conflict exemplified this. While Iran signed the joint declaration, it did so with notably softer language compared to previous engagements. In contrast to a hypothetical past scenario where a joint statement might have condemned US military strikes, the Delhi declaration merely reiterated "serious concern over attacks on civilian infrastructure and IAEA-safeguarded nuclear facilities," deliberately omitting any "strong condemnation." This shift reflects the changed dynamics within the bloc, particularly with the UAE, which has been subjected to Iranian-aligned attacks, now a full member and party to the conflict rather than a distant observer.

Crucially, the Delhi statement made no mention of the Ukraine war, a significant departure from last year’s summit. This silence underscores the deep, irreconcilable differences among members: Russia is a direct belligerent, China maintains a "neutral" stance that often leans towards Moscow, India pursues strategic autonomy with strong ties to both sides, and South Africa upholds a non-aligned foreign policy. Forcing a consensus on Ukraine would have fractured the bloc, illustrating the "lowest common denominator" approach to declaration drafting. Similarly, on trade, the language voiced "serious concern over unilateral tariff measures" and condemned "secondary sanctions," but conspicuously avoided naming the United States as the perpetrator. This strategic ambiguity is understandable, given that several BRICS members maintain complex and vital trade and security relationships with Washington. Such restraint also serves to counter perceptions that BRICS is inherently an anti-Western bloc, allowing members to navigate their diverse international engagements without being forced into an overt ideological confrontation.

What Lies Ahead for BRICS

A grouping that finds consensus most readily on issues of lower stakes runs the risk of being fundamentally misread. BRICS has been alternately hailed as a potent alternative to the Western-led global order, particularly as countries eagerly lined up for membership, and then dismissed as inconsequential when internal divisions, such as those exposed by the Iran war, highlighted its limitations. The successful conclusion of the New Delhi summit with a joint declaration, despite the glaring internal divisions, helps to dispel the latter criticism by demonstrating the bloc’s resilience and commitment to dialogue. However, a consensus achieved by deliberately sidestepping divisive issues inevitably leaves BRICS open to the familiar critique of being merely a "talk shop," long on rhetoric but short on actionable outcomes.

Yet, prospective members appear to view BRICS through a more pragmatic lens. Despite former US President Donald Trump’s previous threats to impose tariffs on countries perceived to be aligning with BRICS, interest in membership has not waned. The allure lies less in ideological alignment and more in tangible benefits: enhanced market access, alternative funding mechanisms, and a seat at a table where the rules of global governance might eventually be reshaped. For example, Southeast Asian nations have calibrated their engagement carefully. Indonesia took full membership, recognizing the strategic benefits of deeper engagement with major emerging economies, while Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam opted for partner state status. This allows them to gain access to BRICS networks and potential benefits without incurring the full obligations of membership or creating the appearance of choosing sides in a great power competition. This pragmatic approach underscores the growing appeal of the "Global South" narrative, which BRICS embodies, offering a platform for nations seeking greater agency and diversification in their international relations.

However, expansion is undeniably a double-edged sword for any consensus-seeking, heterogeneous grouping. While the addition of new members like Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the UAE significantly bolsters the bloc’s collective weight – now representing over 40 percent of the world’s total economic output and a vast proportion of its population – it simultaneously narrows the already constrained ground upon which its members can agree. The New Delhi summit served as a vivid demonstration of just how narrow that common ground has already become.

China is poised to assume the BRICS chairmanship in 2027. President Xi Jinping has consistently championed BRICS as the most vital platform for solidarity among emerging market and developing countries. As the bloc’s largest economy and a consistent advocate for enlargement, Beijing is well-positioned to advance its ambitions for a more multipolar world order and enhance its influence within the Global South. Yet, the question for BRICS as it enters its third decade is not whether its diverse members can speak with one unified voice – an increasingly improbable feat. Instead, the critical challenge is whether a bloc whose unique strength lies in its ability to accommodate profound differences can be leveraged to deliver more than symbolic declarations and facilitate genuine, tangible outcomes that benefit its members and contribute to a more equitable global order. The New Delhi summit underscored that while BRICS can bring adversaries to the table, transforming dialogue into decisive action remains its formidable, ongoing test.